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The term "affirmative action3'-first used by the Roosevelt Administra- 
tion in an executive order in 1941 barring defense contractors from dis- 
criminating against minorities-was revived by President John F. 
Kennedy in a civil rights speech in 1961. Subsequently it was included 
in the language of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, but it was through Lyn- 
don B. Johnson's Executive Order 11246 (1965) concerning nondiscrim- 
ination in government employment that it became a central political and 
legal concept: "The contractor will take affirmative action to ensure that 
applicants are employed, and that employees are treated during 
employment, without regard to their race, creed, color, or national 
origin."l 
Initially the term was taken to mean "a positive effort" to end discrim- 
inatory practices in employment situations. Since then the concept has 
undergone a long process of reinterpretation and redefinition, primarily 
by the Executive Branch and the courts. This article will address the role 
of the US Supreme Court in this process, analyzing the Court's affirma- 
tive action decisions from 1978 to 1990. Four aspects of two main 
areas-education and employment-will be dealt with: admission, 
hiring, promotion, and lay-offs. 
1 Executive Order 11246 (1965), Section 202, (1). 
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The first case to reach the Supreme Court was DeFunis v. Odegaard 
(1974), but a majority of the justices decided that the case was moot, 
since it no longer presented a live controversy. It was therefore Univer- 
sity of California Regents v. Bakke (1978) that came to be the harbinger 
of the new age of affirmative action litigation. The majority held that the 
controversy could be settled under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964 (barring discrimination in programs receiving federal assistance) 
without involving constitutional issues, although Justice Lewis F. Powell, 
Jr., found the Title VI ban and the equal protection clause of the 14th 
Amendment coextensive (and hence that both were violated). The court 
(5-4) thus found the use by the University of California at Davis of a set- 
aside provision (16 out of 100 seats in a freshman class in Medical 
School) for certain racial minority group members a violation of the 
statute. However, Justice Lewis F. Powell joined the minority on the 
second count, whether race may ever be taken into account as one factor 
among several in order to create a "diverse student body." Racial 
classifications are not always unconstitutional, said Powell, provided 
they are proven "necessary to promote a substantial state interest."z 
Thus he employed the "strict scrutiny" standard of review for racial 
classifications. 
The next case to reach the Court, Steelworkers of America v. Weber 
(1979), represented the area of training and promotion. Brian Weber had 
filed suit on a "reverse discrimination" charge when he failed to be 
selected for a skilled-job training program at Kaiser Aluminum, 
Gramercy, La. The company and the union had agreed to a voluntary 
affirmative action plan which reserved 50% of all in-plant craft training 
slots for minorities. 
Again the controversy was dealt with under the Civil Rights Act, this 
time Title VII, which outlaws discriminatory practices in employment. 
Reversing the lower courts, the majority held that Congress could not 
have intended to prohibit private employers from voluntarily instituting 
affirmative action plans to open opportunities for blacks in job areas 
traditionally closed to them. The Court was careful to distinguish 
between the language of Title VII and that of Title VI, which concerns 
programs receiving federal aid. In Title VI, said Justice William Brennan 
for the majority, "Congress was legislating to assure federal funds would 
2 University of Cal$ornia Regents v. Bakke, 438 US.  265 at 307 (1978). 
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not be used in an improper manner. Title VII, by contrast, was enacted 
pursuant to the Commerce power to regulate purely private decision 
making and was not intended to incorporate and particularize the 
commands of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments," which guarantee 
equal protection of the laws against state and federal infringement.3 
In separate dissents Chief Justice Warren Burger and Justice William 
Rehnquist took exception to the majority's interpretation of Title VII 
and its legislative history. Burger wrote: "Under the guise of statutory 
'construction,' the Court effectively rewrites Title VII to achieve what it 
regards as a desirable result. It 'amends' the statute to do precisely what 
both its sponsors and its opponents agreed the statute was not intended 
to do" (at 216). Rehnquist was even harsher in his verdict: The Court's 
opinion was "reminiscent not of jurists such as Hale, Holmes and 
Hughes, but of escape artists such as Houdini." The majority "elude[d] 
clear statutory language, 'uncontradicted' legislative history, and uni- 
form precedent in concluding that employers are, after all, permitted to 
consider race in making employment decisions" (at 222). The main 
point made by the then Chief Justice and his successor in that office was 
that the act forbids any kind of discrimination on account of race, benign 
as well as invidious. 
The third case to appear before the Court combined two aspects of the 
preceding cases, quotas and employment, challenging on constitutional 
grounds the decision by Congress in the Public Works Employment Act 
of 1977 to set aside 10% of federal funds for contracts with minority- 
owned businesses. However, in Fullilove v. Klutznick (1980), the Court 
(6-3) held such set-asides permissible. The Chief Justice, speaking for 
the Court, pointed out that this act was designed to prevent procurement 
practices that Congress had decided might result in the perpetuation of 
the effects of prior discrimination: "Congress has necessary latitude to 
try new techniques such as limited use of racial and ethnic criteria to 
accomplish remedial objectives."4 
Some jurists had a hard time seeing a logical line in Chief Justice 
Burger's arguments in Weber and Fullilove respectively. Actually, the 
solid majority in favor of the quota system in Pullilove was seen by 
many legal scholars as a clear victory for a broad interpretation of the 
3 United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, Kaiser Aluminum v. Weber, United States v. Weber, 443 U S .  
193 at 206, footnote 6 (1979). 
4 Fullilove v. XKutznick, 448 U.S. 448 at 473 and 490 (1980). 
22 American Studies in Scandinavia, Vol. 27, 1995 
concept of affirmative action. Consequently, the Court's decision in the 
next case was anticipated with special interest, since by this time a 
Reagan appointee, Sandra Day O'Connor, had replaced the middle-of- 
the-road Eisenhower appointee Potter Stewart. The case represented an 
important question of principle, since it involved the issue of lay-offs and 
the preservation of gains under affirmative action programs.5 
The Memphis fire department, operating under a consent decree set- 
tling charges of racial discrimination against the department, had laid off 
several white workers with longer seniority than some black firefighters 
hired under the affirmative action decree. The sacked white firefighters 
sued the department, claiming "reverse discrimination" and demanding 
that the general rule of "last hired, first fired" be observed. The Reagan 
Justice Department, in its friend-of-the-court brief, argued that the fire- 
men's seniority system was immunized by the 1964 Civil Rights Act 
against judicial encroachment (unless the system was proven to have 
been designed with the intent of discriminating against minority 
employees). Thereby the Administration was clearly trying to limit the 
reach of affirmative action measures. 
The Court agreed (6-3) with the Administration, holding that the 
federal judge had overstepped his powers when he overrode the senior- 
ity rule to preserve the jobs for the junior black firemen. The Reagan 
Administration hailed the decision and was quick to send a memoran- 
dum to state governments asking them to revise their affirmative action 
programs in light of the decision. However, Justice Byron White (the 
only Kennedy appointee on the Court), writing for the majority, had 
stuck closely to the facts of the case. They had found unconstitutional 
the court order that actually asked the city to ignore traditional seniority 
principles. At the same time, however, they pointed out that Congress in 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 certainly had intended to provide remedies 
for persons who had themselves been victims of illegal discrimination. 
Proponents of affirmative action saw the Stotts decision as a major 
curtailment of the concept as a political tool. Beforehand many legal 
scholars had considered Stotts an ill-suited test case because it attacked 
the age-old principle of seniority head-on, providing virtually no oppor- 
tunity for compromise or partial gains. The concept of affirmative action 
now seemed reduced to make-whole suits, limited to cases involving 
5 Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts et al., 467 U S .  561 (1984). 
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blatant discrimination against identifiable individuals in particular situa- 
tions. The usefulness of the concept of "affirmative action" was thereby 
geatly diminished, since providing evidence of such discriminatory 
practices is a very difficult task. A business practice may be neutral on 
its face but still have discriminatory effects. 
In 1986, after Reagan had added another of his "strict construction- 
ists"-Antonin Scalia-to the High Bench and elevated William Rehn- 
quist to the Chief Justice seat, an interesting development took place 
concerning the Court's view of affirmative action. In three cases the 
Court clearly modified the restrictive view it had seemed to hold in 
Stotts. Admittedly, in a lay-off case very similar to Stotts, Wygant v. 
Jackson Board of Education (1986), the Court held (5-4) that in laying 
off white teachers while retaining blacks with less seniority, the school 
board of Jackson, Michigan, had deprived the former group of equal 
protection of the laws, in violation of the 14th Amendment. The volun- 
tary agreement between the school district and the union was not based 
on findings of previous discrimination, nor was it narrowly tailored 
enough to be acceptable, said the Court majority. 
However, in several opinions making up the majority ruling, the 
justices made it a point to underline that affirmative action was broader 
than the interpretation held forth by the Reagan Administration. Justice 
Powell declared: "As part of this nation's dedication to eradicating racial 
discrimination, innocent persons may be called upon to bear the burden 
of the remedy."6 The Court is in agreement," stated Justice O'Connor 
likewise, that "remedying past or present racial discrimination by a state 
actor is a sufficiently weighty interest to warrant the remedial use of a 
carefully constructed affirmative action program" (at 286). Thereby the 
Court majority ascertained that the concept of affirmative action was 
wider than a mere make-whole remedy for proven cases of concrete, 
individual discrimination. A significant point to note in this context is 
that Justice O'Connor had clearly moved away from the minimalist 
position of the Reagan Administration. 
Justice Powell made a clear distinction between remedies acceptable 
in hiring and firing respectively. He was willing to grant more leeway in 
applying affirmative action considerations in the former than in the latter 
instance, since in hiring "the burden to be borne by innocent individuals 
6 Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education, 476 US.  267 at 280-281 (1986). 
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is ... diffused generally," whereas in the latter situation the loss of a job is 
a much more painful experience (at 282). 
That the Wygant case represented a turning point in the Court's view 
of affirmative action was confirmed by two rulings a few weeks later, at 
the close of the session. Typically, it was the most prominent liberal 
voice on the Court, William Brennan, Jr., who penned the majority 
opinion in both cases. In Local #28 of the Sheet Metal Workers' Inter- 
national v. Equal Employment O p p o r t u n i t y  Commission, the Court (5-4) 
upheld an order requiring a New York union, which had consistently 
refused blacks, to increase its nonwhite membership to 29.23% by 
August 1987.7 In Local #93, International Association of F i r e f i g h t e r s  v. 
City of Cleveland and Cleveland Vanguards, the Court (6-3) held that 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 did not prevent the city from settling a bias 
complaint by adopting a plan which promoted one black firefighter for 
every white promoted.8 
Significantly, Justice O'Connor, who dissented in the Local #28 case, 
criticizing quotas as unacceptable, in the Local #93 case joined the 
majority, accepting the one-to-one provision as a viable tool to augment 
black membership in the higher echelons of the work force. Here it is 
quite difficult to see the philosophical and philological distinctions 
between quotas, goals, and timetables. The main difference, as she saw 
it, was that the fifty-fifty provision of the latter case was an instrument to 
implement the objective of increasing the proportion of blacks in the 
various brackets of employment, whereas the former case set a specific 
goal, which was indistinguishable from a quota. 
Another interesting thing to note in the Court's proceedings that ses- 
sion was the dominant role played by the grand old liberal on the Court, 
William Brennan, one of President Eisenhower's legendary "mistakes."9 
Chief Justice Rehnquist's determination to make a principled pitch to 
mark his ideological position throughout the session sent him and Jus- 
tice Scalia into permanent dissent-joined only by the increasingly con- 
7 Local #28 of the Sheet Metal Workers' International v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, 478 
U.S. 421 (1986). 
8 Local #93, International Association of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland and Cleveland Vanguards, 478 
U.S. 501(1986). 
9 The statement has been attributed to the president that he made two mistakes as president and that both were 
on the Supreme Court, which meant the two liberals Earl Warren and William Brennan, Jr. 
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servative Byron White and, from time to time, by another swing vote- 
allowing in the main Brennan to play a dominant role. 
In the succeeding session the Court continued to pursue its liberal line 
in the field of affirmative action with Justice Brennan still in the driver's 
seat. In United States v. Paradise, the Court (5-4) in February 1987 
upheld an affirmative action plan promoting black Alabama state 
troopers on a one-to-one scheme.10 The Alabama Department of Public 
Safety had a long tradition of discrimination. In 1983, eleven years after 
it had been sued for discriminatory practices against blacks (1972), the 
department had made virtually no progress, and a fifty-fifty plan was 
therefore imposed by a federal judge to enhance the promotion of 
blacks. Justice Brennan, again writing for the majority, described the 
plan as "amply justified, and narrowly tailored to serve the legitimate 
and laudable purposes7' of eradicating a history of blatant discrimination 
(at 232). This time O'Connor swung back to her former conservative 
position, joining Rehnquist, White, and Scalia. Justice Powell remained 
with the liberal bloc made up of Brennan, Marshall, Stevens, and 
Blackmun. 
The liberal line of affirmative action decisions peaked a month later. 
In Johnson v. Transportation Agency, Santa Clara County, California, 
the Court extended the principle of affirmative action to cover women's 
employment situation.11 A voluntary affirmative action plan adopted by 
the Santa Clara County Transportation Department to elevate women 
into high-ranking positions was upheld by the Court (6-3) under Title 
VII of the Civil Rights Act. Diane Joyce had been promoted to road dis- 
patcher, being preferred because of her sex, over Paul Johnson (who had 
scored slightly higher in a screening interview). Johnson, in turn, filed a 
"reverse discrimination" suit against the agency. 
Justice Brennan, writing for the Court, drew the line from the Weber 
decision (1979) regarding voluntary affirmative action programs by 
employers, this time extending the principle to public employers. In his 
view, the Santa Clara plan was "a moderate, flexible, case-by-case 
approach to effecting a gradual improvement in the representation of 
minorities and women in the agency's work force" (at 1457). A highly 
significant point in this decision was that statistics would suffice as evi- 
10 United States v. Paradise, 94 L Ed 2d 203. 
11 Johnson v. Tranportation Agency, Santa Clara County, Cal., 107 S.Ct. 1442 (1987). 
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dence of discriminatory practices. No proof of discriminatory intent was 
called for. 
The following year no affirmative action rulings were issued by the 
Supreme Court. However, a replacement was found for Lewis F. Powell, 
Jr., who had retired in June 1987, at the close of the 1986 session. After 
President Reagan's highly ideological and controversial nominee, 
Robert Bork, had gone down in defeat in the Senate hearings, a nearly 
as conservative, but far more anonymous appointee was found in 
Anthony Kennedy. Some liberal observers have claimed that the Senate 
in this case was tricked into accepting pest over cholera as a result of 
battle fatigue. I will let that issue rest, but it is quite clear that Justice 
Kennedy's entrance in replacement of Justice Powell, the swinger, ini- 
tially meant a general conservative turn of the Court, also regarding 
"affirmative action." 
A clear hint of an incipient change in the Court's view of affirmative 
action cases was given in a civil rights case involving "disparate 
impact," Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, in the last month of the 
Court's sitting in the spring of 1988.12 Although Anthony Kennedy took 
no part in the consideration or decision of the case, his presence seems 
to have had a symbolic impact. The Court was basically in agreement on 
most parts of the case, but a significant split occurred over Parts 11-C and 
11-D, involving the question of "disparate impact" and the burden of 
proof in such instances. Here Justice O'Connor-supported by Rehn- 
quist, Scalia, and White-claimed that the "extension of disparate 
impact analysis calls for a fresh and somewhat closer examination of the 
constraints that operate to keep that analysis within its proper bonds7' (at 
994). Signaling a change in the Court's traditional standard on this point 
even more clearly, Justice O'Connor explicated further: "Moreover, we 
do not believe that each verbal formulation used in prior opinions to 
describe the evidentiary standards in disparate impact cases is automati- 
cally applicable in light of today's decision" (at 994, fn.. 2). 
The entire Court agreed that disparate impact analysis may be applied 
to a subjective or discretionary promotion system (at 985-991, 999- 
1000). Where the pluralities speaking through Justices O'Connor and 
Blackmun respectively (the latter joined in part by Justice Stevens) were 
at loggerheads was on the burden of and nature of proof. In O'Connor's 
12 487 U.S. 977 (1988). 
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view, reliance on statistics as prima facie evidence of different treatment 
could lead to the adoption of quotas and other preferential systems by 
the employers as preventive measures, in conflict with the legislative 
intent of Congress (at 992-993). Furthermore, the plaintiff was to identify 
the employer's use of discriminatory practices and show how these were 
related to the exclusion of applicants for jobs or promotion (at 995). 
Justice Blackmun, on the other hand, took issue with O'Connor's 
representation of the Court's record on this point. He rejected the plu- 
rality's claim that, in the context of a disparate-impact challenge, "the 
ultimate burden of proving that discrimination against a protected group 
has been caused by a specific employment practice remains with the 
plaintiff all the time'' (at 1002). He argued that there is a significant dis- 
tinction between disparate-impact and individual disparate-treatment 
claims. Whereas the latter hinges on the plaintiff's ability to establish 
intent, the former focuses on result, and while the latter evidence must 
often be established by inference, the former is "directly established by 
the numerical disparity" (at 1004). Here a new, but fundamental cleav- 
age within the Court was apparent. The seeds that were sown in the final 
days of the Court's 1987 term, were to spring into full bloom the follow- 
ing year. 
The occasion was provided by a string of cases pertaining to civil 
rights which were handled by the Court in the spring session of 1989. 
The series of rulings which were handed down by the Rehnquist Court 
that season signaled a decisive shift to the right. Typically, former Assis- 
tant Attorney General for Civil Rights in the Reagan Administration, 
William Bradford Reynolds, at the close of the term triumphantly 
declared: "The Court has said that discrimination is the watchword. It is 
not going to be underrepresentation or proportionality or statistical 
imbalance, but discrimination."" That seems to be an accurate observa- 
tion, but it tells only part of the story. What needs to be added is that the 
Court in the process also tightened the criteria defining discrimination. 
Actually, by its new line of decisions, the Court revived the debate that 
President Lyndon B. Johnson had triggered 22 years earlier in a speech 
at Howard University: "You do not take a person who for years has been 
hobbled by chains and liberate him, bring him to the starting line of a 
13 National Journal, 8/5/89, p. 1972. 
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race and say, 'You are free to compete with all the others,' and still 
justly believe that you have been completely fair."l4 
The main significance of the rulings in these cases was that the rein- 
terpretations offered by the Court did not so much address the statutory 
foundation as the superstructure of judicial interpretation of this com- 
plex area of adjudication. Actually, in the process the Court had taken a 
second look at one of the very foundations of civil rights legislation, 
Section 1981 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866. That law had last been vis- 
ited in 1976, in Runyon v. McCrary, and had then been held to bar pri- 
vate as well as officially sponsored acts of racial discrimination.15 In 
1989, a brief filed on behalf of 145 Representatives and 66 Senators 
asked the Court not to tamper with precedent (as did a number of briefs 
amici curiae, including some from rather conservative legal scholars). 
In the case in question, Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, the Court 
unanimously did what the 211 Senators and Representatives asked it to 
do: retain its 1976 decision in Runyon v. McCrary, which interpreted 
the Reconstruction civil rights statute so as to bar private as well as 
officially sponsored discrimination.16 
However, the new hard-core conservative majority (5-4)-Justices 
O'Connor, Rehnquist, White, Scalia, and Kennedy-then revisited 
$1981, giving it a new and restrictive interpretation. Justice Kennedy, 
(symbolically significantly) writing for that majority, found that $1981 
covered discrimination in the initial hiring process but not discrimina- 
tory treatment on the job.17 
Even more destructive to the cause of fairness in workplace relations 
was the Court's decision in the Alaska case Wards Cove Packing v. 
Atonio, involving the canning industry. Here the Court actually shifted 
the burden of proof in alleged discrimination cases.18 Since the Court's 
14 Zbid., p. 1972. 
15 Runyon et ux, DBA Bobbe's School v. McCrary et a1 ., 427 U S .  160 (1975). The Court made it clear 
that 51981 is short for 42 U.S.C. $1981 (The Civil Rights Act of 1866, 14 Stat. 27 ) . In the 1874 process of 
codifying federal law, what became 42 U.S.C. $1981 was "drawn from both $1 of the 1870 Act and $1 of the 
1866 Act" (at 169 ). The Court further made it explicitly clear that "$ 1981 likewise reaches purely private acts of 
discrimination" (at 170). 
16 Patterson v. McLean, 491 U S .  164: "This Court will not overrule its decision in Runyon v. McCrary, 
427 U. S . 160, that its $1981 prohibits racial discrimination in the making and enforcement of private 
contracts. Stare decisis compels the Courts to adhere to that interpretation, absent some 'special justification' not 
to do so." 
17 Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 US.  164, at 176-77 (1989). 
18 Wards Cove Packing Co. et al. v. Atonio et al., 490 U.S. 641 (1989). 
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dictum in Griggs v. Georgia (1971) the Civil Rights Act of 1964 had 
been held to proscribe not only practices which were discriminatory in 
intent but in operation as well, a position which had been clearly con- 
firmed by the Court as recent as 1987, in Johnson v. Transportation 
Agency. A harbinger of the new times had been the Court's decision in 
Watkins (1988), but by its Wards Cove ruling, penned by Byron White, 
the Court definitely shifted the burden onto the plaintiff to disprove the 
employer's assertion that the adverse employment action or practice in 
question rests on legitimate neutral consideration. To make their verdict 
square with past decisions by the Court (and evade the distinction 
between disparate-impact and disparate-treatment claims made by 
Justice Blackmun in Watkins) the majority made a new distinction 
between the burdens of "production" of evidence and "persuasion" by 
evidence: "The persuasion burden must here remain with the plaintive 
..."( at 660). Although neither Patterson nor Wards Cove were affirmative 
action cases proper, they were essential to such cases since they affected 
the burden and standards of proof. 
Since Weber (1979) voluntary affirmative action plans agreed on by 
employers and unions had not been held to violate Title VII. Now, Mar- 
tin v. Wilks turned the tables, by stating that a settlement in the form of a 
consent decree between one group of employees (in this case black fire- 
fighters) and their employer (the City of Birmingham) cannot possibly 
settle, voluntarily or otherwise, the conflicting claims of employees who 
were no part of the agreement.19 The Court thereby rejected the 
"impermissible collateral attack" doctrine which immunizes parties to a 
consent decree from discrimination charges by nonparties for actions 
taken pursuant to the decree. Attorneys General of a great number of 
states had filed briefs amici curiae in favor of upholding the consent 
decree in such cases (at 757-758). 
Finally, in City of Richmond v. Croson, the Court found that the city 
had failed to demonstrate "a compelling governmental interest9' justify- 
ing its set-aside plan for Minority Business Enterprises (MBEs), and thus 
did not meet the requirement of the strict scrutiny standard of review. 
The plan required prime contractors to set aside at least 30% of the dol- 
lar amount of each contract to one or more MBEs.20 The nonwhite popu- 
19 Martin et al. V.  Wilks et al., 490 U.S. 755 (1989). 
20 City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989). 
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lation of the city was about 50%. Justice O'Connor's verdict was clear: 
"Because the city of Richmond has failed to identify the need for reme- 
dial action in the awarding of its public construction contracts, the 
treatment of its citizens on a racial basis violates the dictates of the Equal 
Protection Clause" (at 51 1). This seemed to fly straight in the face of the 
Court's decision in Fullilove (1980) . 
The 1989 decisions triggered an immediate initiative in Congress to 
overturn the Court decisions. However, that is not an easy task. For 
instance, when the Court in 1984, in Grove City College v. Bell, ruled 
that federal funds might be used to support schools that practice discrim- 
ination in their programs, congressional efforts to overturn that decision 
became mired in a debate over its possible impact on abortion rights, 
and it took nearly four years before the Civil Rights Restoration Act 
finally became law over President Reagan's veto in 1988. 
Civil rights bills intended to overturn the Court's Patterson and Wards 
Cove rulings were vetoed by President Bush in 1990 and 1991. A 
revised version finally passed muster and was enacted as Public Law 
102-166 on November 21, 1991. Known as the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 
it rejected the Court's narrow construction in Patterson in two subsec- 
tions: "(b) For the purposes of this section, the term 'make and enforce 
contracts' includes the making, performance, modification, and terrnina- 
tion of contracts, and the enjoyment of all benefits, privileges, terms, and 
conditions of the contractual relationship," and "(c) The rights protected 
by this section are protected against impairment by nongovernmental 
discrimination and impairment under color of State Law" (at 1072). It 
also overturned Wards Cove by returning the burden to employers who 
are sued for discrimination of proving that their hiring practices are 
"job-related to the position in question and consistent with business 
necessity."21 The Act in fact overturned 12 rulings of the Court (and, as a 
parenthetical note, it might be mentioned that, despite the arduous task 
involved, in the period between 1967 and 1990, Congress overrode 121 
of the Court's statutory rulings, 89 of which were less than 10 years 
old) .22 
In the meantime, however, the Court had seemed to check its veering 
motion and take a swing back by its 1990 decision in Metro Broadcast- 
21 Sec. 105, (a)-(i). 
22 David M. O'Brien, Supreme Court Watch-1992: A Supplement to Constitutional Law and Politics, 
Volumes One and Two (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1992), pp. 27-28. 
ing, Znc. v. Federal Communications Cornmission.23 Only one term after 
the Croson ruling, the Court upheld the FCC's set-aside programs for 
minority contractors. Symbolically significant, in his last opinion for the 
Court, Justice Brennan was able to pull Justice Byron White across the 
aisle to join the liberal wing to (1) uphold FCC's "distress sales" pro- 
gram giving preference to prospective minority owners of TV and radio 
stations when licenses are revoked or basic qualifications to hold the 
license are scrutinized, and (2) to give enhanced weight to minority 
ownership when considering licensing in so-called comparative pro- 
ceedings. The main justification for the ruling was deference to both the 
expertise of the FCC and the findings of Congress based on the 
"conclusion that there is an empirical nexus between minority owner- 
ship and broadcasting diversity."24 Hence, according to Brennan, the 
benefits of ethnically dispersed ownership would "redound to all mem- 
bers of the viewing and listening audiences" (at 465), a concept that 
amounted to racial stereotyping, in the view of Justice O'Connor.25 Jus- 
tice Kennedy, refusing to accept a distinction between invidious and 
benign discrimination, in his dissent argued that all racial classifications, 
no matter their purpose, should be subject to strict scrutiny (at 3046). 
Justice White's acceptance of Brennan's argument could be com- 
pared to Justice Powell's willingness in the Bakke case (1978) to accept 
race as one factor among many to achieve a diverse student body. 
White's replacement, Ruth Bader Ginsburg probably holds a similar 
view, which would indicate a majority for the "diversity" concept in 
future rulings in such cases. However, much hinges on Justice Black- 
mun's successor, Stephen G. Breyer, a pragmatic centrist who has no 
clear track record in affirmative action cases, but who has shown intel- 
lectual capacity and stamina in his voting patterns on the 1st Circuit 
Court of Appeals.26 
It is not easy, on the basis of the Court's decisions in affirmative 
action cases, to discern a clear and consistent line of principle in its 
rulings. Nonetheless, certain generalizations may safely be made: (I) 
23 Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. Federal Communications Commission, 11 1 L Ed 2d 445. 
24 111LEd2d445at466. 
25 110 S.Ct. 2997 at 3037, 3038. 
26 "Stephen Breyer: The Pragmatic Choice for the Court," in The Washington Post Weekly, May 23-29, 
1994, pp. 14-15; "The Practical Idealist," WPW, July 4-10, 1994, pp. 6-7; "Breyer could be force on the court," 
USA Today, May 17, 1994. 
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Certain affirmative-action measures may pass muster in hiring, but not in 
firing. (2) Rigid quotas are out, but timetables and goals may be ac- 
ceptable under certain circumstances. A 50-50 hiring and promotion 
quota may be accepted as a remedy to increase nonwhite membership in 
the work force or in labor unions where discriminatory practices have 
been proven (Local #93; Paradise). Such a device may even be used to 
reach a specific percentage goal in such cases (Local #28). Set asides are 
acceptable as a remedy used by Congress to make up for past wrongdo- 
ings, but not for a state or a city, a reasoning which has shaky founda- 
tions even within the Court. 
In the general political debate, the "innocent victim" concept has 
been a central argument against affirmative action measures, but a 
majority on the Court has been willing to modify the sweeping force of 
this doctrine, as witnessed in Wygant. The "colorblind Constitution" 
concept has been almost equally ubiquitous, along with the "demeaning 
effect on minorities" argument. On the other hand, President Johnson's 
"hobbled slave" image has proven effective among the justices. On the 
question of disparate impact analysis the Court is divided, making pos- 
sible a decisive early impact on affirmative action by the recent 
appointees. The bottom line so far is that color-conscious affirmative- 
action measures have been accepted by a solid majority as being 
broader than mere "make-whole" provisions. 
In general, the future of affirmative action seems quite open-ended, 
but by now the principle of stare decisis is working for the concept of 
affirmative action, since such programs are so widespread: They have 
become an integral part of the American social fabric. 
